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Abstract
Climate change is a formidable topic, challenging the research efforts of countless scientists
across many different fields. Surveys find surprisingly high levels of confidence among
nonscientists, however, regarding their own understanding of climate change. More than three-
fourths of the respondents on recent U.S. surveys claimed to understand either a moderate
amount or a great deal about climate change. Follow-up questions testing actual knowledge
suggest that self-assessments are high relative to physical-world knowledge. For some people,
self-assessments reflect confidence in their political views rather than geographical or science
knowledge. This paper replicates and extends previous research using new data: an October 2018
survey that included a four-item test of basic, climate-relevant but belief-neutral geographical or
physical knowledge, such as locations of the North and South Pole. Mean knowledge scores are
higher among younger, male, and college-educated respondents, and also differ significantly
across political groups. Relationships between physical/geographical knowledge and self-
assessed understanding of climate change, or between knowledge and agreement with the
scientific consensus on climate change, are sometimes positive as expected — but in both cases,
these relationships depend on political identity.
1. Overview
Climate change is a complex topic, engaging the research efforts of thousands of scientists in
scores of disciplines around the world (IPCC 2013; USGCRP 2017). Public understanding of this
complex science proves, unsurprisingly, to be somewhat limited (Hamilton 2012; Leiserowitz et
al. 2010). Scientific information in the public sphere also is actively countered by scientific-
sounding misinformation from political, economic and media forces opposed to climate-change
mitigation (Dunlap and McCright 2015; Farrell et al. 2019). Despite the inherent complexity of
the science, and organized distraction of opposing voices, surveys find the American public fairly
confident about their understanding of this topic: most people say they understand “a moderate
amount” or “a great deal” about this issue (Hamilton 2011). Some analysts have treated such self-
assessments as a rough proxy for actual knowledge, but an obvious high bias and correlations
with political identity make self-assessments poorly suited for this purpose. A more empirical
approach views self-assessments as interesting in their own right, worthy of focused research.
A recent paper by Hamilton (2018) analyzed self-assessed understanding of climate change in a
2016 nationwide survey. That survey included five questions testing climate-relevant but belief-
neutral awareness of the physical world, such as knowing about the locations of North and South
Poles. Scores on this five-item test confirm earlier impressions of limited public knowledge, and
of self-assessments confounded with politics. The association between self-assessed
understanding and actual knowledge appears modest but positive (higher self-assessments
coinciding with greater knowledge) among self-identified liberal and moderate respondents (or
Democrats and Independents). Among the most conservative, however, self-assessments appear
unrelated or even negatively related to knowledge. Within that group, self assessed
“understanding of climate change” to a greater degree reflects political confidence, rather than
confidence in knowledge of science or the physical world. This result was replicated in that 2018
paper using data from statewide 2014–2015 New Hampshire surveys, in addition to the main
2016 nationwide survey.
The present paper presents a third replication, this time using a newer statewide New Hampshire
survey conducted in October 2018. The new survey is smaller in scale, and included only four of
the original five knowledge questions, but it did ask the same self-assessment and climate-change
belief questions as the earlier surveys. Results from this analysis broadly agree with main
conclusions from both datasets in the earlier study.
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2. October 2018 survey
From October 19 to 28, 2018, trained personnel at the Survey Center of the University of New
Hampshire conducted 607 cell and landline telephone interviews with randomly-selected New
Hampshire residents for a quarterly Granite State Poll. Climate change understanding and belief
questions were asked, along with the four-item knowledge quiz, respondent background
characteristics, and other questions for different projects. Response rate for this poll was 20
percent, calculated by AAPOR (2016) definition 3. Sampling weights, applied to all graphs and
analyses in this paper, allow for minor adjustments to achieve more representative results with
respect to respondent age, sex, education and region of the state, along with household size and
number of telephones. On climate-change and science-related topics, Granite State Poll results
often fall close to those of nationwide surveys (Hamilton 2016a, 2016b; Hamilton et al. 2015,
2018).
Table 1 gives the question wording and response distributions for variables from the October
2018 survey. Climate is a standard climate-beliefs question, with one response choice (climate
change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities) corresponding to consensus
statements of most science organizations (e.g., first two sentences of AGU 2013). This question
has been carried on many different surveys, cumulatively tens of thousands of interviews (e.g.,
Hamilton 2019; Hamilton et al. 2015). In almost all of these interviews, the climate question
immediately followed the understand question, which introduced the topic of climate change or
global warming (e.g., Hamilton 2011). The four knowledge questions listed in Table 1, placed
later in the interview after some unrelated intervening questions, ask about very basic and mostly
geographical information that has high relevance to climate-change topics. By design, these
questions do not explicitly address the reality of climate change, and their correct answers cannot
be guessed from (or biased by) politically-linked climate change beliefs. The number of correct
answers provides a simple knowledge score ranging from 0 to 4. These same four items, plus one
other, formed the five-item knowledge quiz analyzed in Hamilton (2018).
Two other differences between this new 2018 survey and the 2014–2016 surveys in Hamilton
(2018) are worth noting. The earlier analysis employed a four-party political scheme or five-
category ideologies, because overall sample sizes were large enough to support such divisions. In
a similar vein, the earlier analysis focused on respondents who claimed “a great deal” of
understanding about climate change. A smaller sample for the 2018 New Hampshire survey (607
instead of 1,411 or 1,571 interviews) makes the finer gradations of the previous analysis less
practical in this case; smaller subsamples yield unstable results. To keep subsamples sufficiently
large, in this paper we employ a simple 3-party political scheme, and focus on respondents who
understand either “a great deal” or “a moderate amount.” The codes listed for understand and
party in Table 1 reflect these decisions.
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Table 1: Variable definitions with regression codes and weighted summary statistics from October 2018
Granite State Poll, n = 607. Order of responses to climate and knowledge question rotated in interviews.
Understanding and Views about Climate Change
Understand — “How much do you feel you understand about the issue of global warming or climate
change?”
A great deal (1, 23%)
A moderate amount (1, 57%)
Only a little (0, 17%)
Nothing at all (0, 3%)
Climate — “Which of the following three statements do you think is more accurate?”
Climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities (1, 63%)
Climate change is happening now, but caused mainly by natural forces (0, 28%)
Climate change is not happening now (0, 3%)
Don’t know/no answer (0, 6%)
Knowledge Questions
Greenhouse — “Scientists use the term greenhouse effect to describe…”
A hole in the ozone layer (22%)
The heat-trapping properties of certain gases such as CO2 (correct, 67%)
The warming effect of pavement and cities (4%)
Don’t know/no answer (7%)
Npole — “Which best describes the North Pole?”
Ice a few feet or yards thick, over deep ocean (correct, 43%)
Ice more than a mile thick, over land (38%)
Rocky, mountainous landscape (4%)
Don’t know/no answer (14%)
Spole — “Which best describes the South Pole?”
Ice a few feet or yards thick, over deep ocean (20%)
Ice more than a mile thick, over land (correct, 48%)
Rocky, mountainous landscape (16%)
Don’t know/no answer (16%)
Sealevel — “Which would do the most to raise sea level, if it melted?”
Arctic sea ice (39%)
Greenland & Antarctic land ice (correct, 31%)
Himalayan glaciers (12%)
Don’t know/no answer (18%)
Knowledge — Number of knowledge questions answered correctly (0 to 4, mean 1.9)
Respondent Characteristics
Age — Age in years (18 to 92 years, mean 48)
Sex — (0 if male, 49%; 1 if female, 51%)
Education — “What is the highest grade in school, or level of education that you’ve completed and
received credit for?” (1 if High School or less to 4 if postgraduate work, mean 2.2)
Party —“Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent or what?”  (1 if Democrat, 43%; 2 if Independent, 17%; 3 if Republican, 40%)
3. Self-assessed understanding of climate change
Figure 1a charts responses to the climate question. Sixty-three percent agree with the scientific
consensus that climate change is happening now and caused mainly by human activities. This
resembles findings from other recent U.S. and New Hampshire polls (Hamilton et al. 2019).
Twenty-eight percent concede that climate change is happening, but mainly for natural reasons.
These two responses, with opposite implications for whether mitigation policies are needed,
together account for 91 percent of the sample—and illustrate how misleading it would be to
simply ask people whether they think that climate is changing, without reference to cause.
Figure 1b charts the percentage of now/human responses by political party, showing a 54-point
gap between Democrats and Republicans. Large majorities of Democrats and Independents
accept the scientific consensus on climate, but two-thirds of Republicans reject it.
On this 2018 survey, most people said they understand either “a moderate amount” (57 percent)
or “a great deal” (23 percent) about the issue of climate change (Figure 1c). That high result
almost duplicates the corresponding responses on a 2016 nationwide survey (57 percent
moderate, 24 percent a great deal) analyzed in Hamilton (2018). On the 2018 survey in Figure 1d,
Democrats appear more likely than Independents or Republicans to say they understand a
moderate amount or a great deal.
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4. A simple test of knowledge
Previous surveys identified two broad kinds of climate-related knowledge among the public:
facts that can or cannot be guessed (right or wrongly) on the basis of one’s beliefs about climate
2change (Hamilton 2012, 2015). For example, the rise in atmospheric CO  concentrations, or the
decline in Arctic sea ice, are universally accepted scientific observations of central importance to
the topic of climate change. When these facts are posed as questions on surveys, however, many
people respond as if we had asked for their opinions about climate change. Those who reject the
2reality of anthropogenic climate change (ACC) are more likely also to reject the reality of CO
increase or Arctic sea ice decline. Responses to these factual questions thus are contaminated by
opinions, so that we cannot meaningfully analyze them as separate cognitions.
The four knowledge questions studied here represent a different kind of fact, which cannot be
guessed from opinions about climate change. Consequently, as survey questions they behave
more like neutral knowledge, although still directly relevant to the understanding of climate
change (see discussion in Hamilton 2018). Someone who does not know the meaning of
“greenhouse effect,” for example, or that the North Pole is in the middle of an ocean, could not
plausibly be considered to understand “a great deal” or even “a moderate amount” about climate
change.
Figures 2a-d chart responses to each of the four knowledge questions. Figure 2e graphs overall
scores; only 30 percent of respondents answered more than two questions correctly.
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Who did relatively well, or poorly, on this knowledge quiz? Figure 3 breaks down mean scores
by respondent background characteristics, all of which exhibit significant differences. Education
differences are most notable. We also see ideological or political differences, with Democrats or
liberals scoring highest (roughly consistent with their relatively higher knowledge scores seen in
Figure 1d). People who claim moderate or great understanding also tend to score higher—but
even among those claiming “a great deal” of understanding, the average is barely above two
answers correct out of four.
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5. Predictors of knowledge and understanding
Table 2 summarizes results from three regressions. The first of these involves knowledge scores
regressed on respondent age, sex, education and party, all of which have statistically significant
effects. Other things being equal, knowledge scores tend to be higher among younger, male, well-
educated and Democratic respondents.
Table 2: Predictors of knowledge scores, understand moderate/great amount about climate change (self
assessed), and agreement that climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities.
Coefficients and standard errors from weighted linear (knowledge) or weighted logistic (understand,
climate) regressions.
Knowledge Understand Climate
Age –0.009 (0.003)** 0.005 (0.008) –0.027 (0.007)***
Sex (female) –0.472 (0.106)*** –0.459 (0.312) 0.779 (0.283)**
Education 0.270 (0.047)*** 0.250 (0.147)† 0.177 (0.128)
Party
Democrat ... ... ...
Independent –0.420 (0.164)* 0.487 (0.685) –0.043 (0.722)
Republican –0.347 (0.116)** 0.851 (0.621) –1.238 (0.572)*
Knowledge ... 0.993 (0.247)*** 0.671 (0.208)**
Knowledge×party
Knowledge×Democrat ... ... ...
Knowledge×Independent ... –0.594 (0.362) –0.637 (0.330)†
Knowledge×Republican ... –0882 (0.327)** –0.661 (0.260)*
constant 2.234 –0.373 (0.729) 1.229 (0.698)
F test vs. constant only 14.36*** 3.03** 11.83***
estimation sample 544 544 544
† p # 0.10;   * p # 0.05;   ** p # 0.01;   *** p # 0.001
The second model in Table 2 is a logit regression of claiming to understanding a moderate
amount or great deal about climate change (understand = 1) on the same background
characteristics, and also on knowledge scores. Probabilities of claiming moderate/great
understanding are significantly higher among respondents with more education, and also with
greater knowledge. One noteworthy result: although political party exhibits a significant bivariate
association with self-assessed understanding (Figure 1d), party differences are not significant
once we control for knowledge scores in the multivariate analysis of Table 2. These results
suggest that the party differences seen earlier reflect differences in knowledge rather than
knowledge-free differences in confidence. 
Finally, a third column in Table 2 summarizes the logit regression of recognizing the reality of
ACC (climate = 1) on background characteristics, objective knowledge, and self-assessed
8
understanding. Other things being equal, agreement with the scientific consensus is higher among
younger, female, and Democrat or Independent respondents with greater knowledge.
The models for both understand and climate also include interaction terms for knowledge×party,
which previous work (Hamilton 2018) found to be important. The presence of these interactions,
significant in both models, alters the interpretation of main effects from knowledge and party.
The significant main effects of knowledge indicate that among Democrats (the base category of
party), knowledge has a positive effect on self-assessed understanding, and on acceptance of
ACC. More knowledgeable Democrats more often claim moderate/high understanding. Also,
they more often accept the reality of ACC.
The main effects of party, by similar reasoning, represent the effects of each category of party
(relative to Democrats, the base category) when knowledge = 0, that is for people who answered
no questions correctly. Only Republican party identification in the climate model exhibits a
significant main effect. This indicates that Republicans with zero knowledge scores are less
inclined than Democrats with zero knowledge to accept the reality of ACC.
Knowledge×party interaction terms have significant effects in both models, more interesting than
the main effects themselves. Such interactions, a key finding of Hamilton (2018), are replicated
here with somewhat different variables and completely new data.
6. Interaction of knowledge with politics
The adjusted margins plot in Figure 4, calculated from the second model in Table 2, visualizes
the knowledge×party interaction effect on understand. Among Democrats and to a lesser degree
Independents, self-assessed understanding is positively related to knowledge. Among
Republicans on the other hand, understanding and knowledge appear almost unrelated. This
result parallels the key finding from both nationwide and earlier New Hampshire surveys in
Hamilton (2018).
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People of all political identities tend to overstate their understanding of climate change, judging
from simple knowledge tests in this study and others (Hamilton 2012; Leiserowitz et al. 2010).
That tendency is stronger in some groups than others, however, which might partly reflect
different concepts of “understanding.” A scientist or science-aware layperson could interpret this
question as asking about their comprehension of scientific research, or of evidence from the
physical world. Alternatively, however, others could interpret the question as referring to their
political certainty on the topic, such as firmly believing that anthropogenic climate change is real
or not real. This second interpretation appears more prevalent among conservatives.
7. Discussion
If the scientific evidence for human-caused climate change is overwhelming, and has been for
years, why does a large fraction of the U.S. public still reject its reality? One simple hypothesis,
called the information deficit model, holds that people fail to accept scientific conclusions
because they lack good information (Suldovsky 2017). Experimental studies that find opinions
changing after provision of information give support to this view, as does recent work on
“inoculating” people against misinformation (Cook et al. 2017; Farrell et al. 2019; van der
Linden et al 2017). Nonexperimental studies provide some support also, in the widely noted
positive effects of education, knowledge or science literacy on ACC acceptance (Ehret et al.
2017; Hamilton et al. 2012, 2015).
The information deficit model does less well at explaining other aspects of ACC rejection, which
reflect organized disinformation campaigns that often target scientific conclusions and scientists
10
along with the concept itself (Dunlap and McCright 2015). Among the public, well-educated
conservatives are among the most vehement opponents (Drummond & Fischhoff 2017; Hamilton
2008, 2011, 2012; McCright and Dunlap 2011). Rejection of ACC by conservative information
elites requires different hypotheses involving the politically selective acquisition of information.
Many overlapping theories incorporate this process, such as biased assimilation (Corner et al.
2012; Ehret et al. 2017; McCright and Dunlap 2011), elite cues (Brulle et al. 2012; Carmichael
and Brulle 2017; Darmofal 2005), motivated reasoning (Kraft et al. 2015; Kunda 1990; Taber
and Lodge 2006), compensatory control (Kay et al. 2009), or cultural cognition (Kahan et al.
2011).
The information-deficit and information-filtering hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and
both well supported by different lines of evidence. They evidently apply to different degrees
among different people and on different topics. The knowledge×party interaction effects of Table
2 and Figure 1 appear consistent with both information-deficit and information-filtering
processes as well. Among Democrats and Independents, greater physical-world knowledge is
associated with higher confidence about understanding climate change, and higher probabilities
of agreeing with scientists on ACC. These patterns are consistent with information deficit, and its
corollary that improving science communication could shift views—for some people. Among
Republicans, on the other hand, there appears to be less relationship between physical-world
knowledge and self-assessed understanding. Consequently, their beliefs about climate change
may be less responsive to science communication, if that conflicts with firmly held political
views. Indeed there could be a “backfire effect,” whereby provision of scientific climate-change
information strengthened their conviction that it is false. Shifting firmly-held views away from
climate-change rejection remains a challenge in this field, not easily resolved. For a larger
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